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Protecting Fugitives' Rights While Ensuring 
the Prosecution and Punishment of 
Criminals: An Examination of the New EU 
Extradition Treaty 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1993, the Spanish government requested the extradition of 
two suspected members of ETA, a Basque separatist terrorist organiza-
tion, from Belgium.1 The Belgian Conseil d'Etat refused to extradite 
the two Spanish nationals on grounds that Belgian law does not spe-
cifically define "participation in an armed group" as a crime and, also, 
that the charge was for a "political offense."2 Under the provisions of 
the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, such grounds preclude 
Belgium from extraditing a requested fugitive. 3 
As a result, Spain severed judicial ties with Belgium and threatened 
to block upcoming European Union (EU) reforms to the Maastricht 
Treaty, unless extradition and asylum laws in EU countries were first 
reformed to ensure that suspected members of terrorist groups such 
as ETA would never again be sheltered by EU Member States.4 Spe-
1 Spain Threatens to Block EU Refurm Over ETA Asylum, Reuter Eur. Community Rpt., Feb. 2, 
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. "ETA" ("Euskadi Ta Askatosunaj means 
"the Basque Nation and Liberty." ETA's goal is Basque independence from Spain. Michael S. 
Carter, Note, Ethnic Minority Groups and Self-Determination: The Case of the Basques, 20 CoLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 55, 78 (1986). 
2 Extradition Convention: Council Agrees to Synchronize Procedures, June 29, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
3 See European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957,359 U.N.T.S. 273,278 (1957). Article 
3 of the Convention provides: 
!d. 
1. Extradition shall not be granted if the offense in respect of which it is requested is 
regarded by the requested Party as a political offense or as an offense connected with 
a political offense. 
2. The same rule shall apply if the requested Party has substantial grounds for believing 
that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal offense has been made for the 
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nation-
ality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of 
these reasons. 
4 Spain Demands End to Political Asylum Within EU, Reuters World Serv., Apr. 9, 1996, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
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cifically, Spain called for the abolition of the political offense exception 
that currently exists in most bilateral and multilateral extradition trea-
ties between Member States.5 Spain also urged the relaxation of the 
"dual criminality" rule, which specifies that the criminal act concerned 
be an offense in both States, and sought to encourage Member States 
to extradite their own nationals for offenses committed abroad.6 
On September 27, 1996,Justice Ministers from the fifteen EU Mem-
ber States signed a new European Union Convention on Extradition 
which provides that an EU State shall not refuse an extradition request 
by another Member State on grounds that the offense is political. 7 This 
is the second convention on extradition to be adopted since the Maas-
tricht Treaty became effective.8 The purpose of the new Convention is 
to supplement and improve the functioning of the 1957 European 
Convention on Extradition, and the 1977 European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism, both promulgated by the Council of 
Europe.9 
Proponents of the new Convention hail the demise of the political 
offense exception as a necessary precondition to fighting terrorist 
activities within the fifteen-nation bloc.10 They argue that the political 
offense exception has unfairly allowed those who have committed 
serious international crimes to benefit from criminal immunity due to 
the political nature of their crime.11 Elimination of the political offense 
exception, in this view, serves to ensure the security of European 
citizens in the new Europe without internal borders.12 
On the other hand, critics of the elimination of the political offense 
exception, such as Amnesty International, fear that the fugitive's right 
5 Home Office: Agreement Reached on EU Extmdition Convention, Information Access Co.,July 1, 
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Home Office]; Spain Threatens 
to Block EU Reform Over ETA Asylum, supra note 1. 
6 Home Office, supra note 5; Spain Threaten to Block EU Reform Over ETA Asylum, supra note 1. 
7 EU Accord on Anti-Terror Strategy, Press Assoc. Newsfile, Sept. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
8 See European Convention on Extradition, 359 U.N.T.S. at 272. 
9 Council of Ministers Press Release, 1996 Commission of the European Communities, Sept. 27, 
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EClaw File; see European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism, Nov. 1977, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1977); European Convention on Extradition, supra note 
3, 359 U.N.T.S. 273. 
10 EU to Ease Extradition Procedures, Reuters World Serv., June 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
ll CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 23 
(1980). 
12 See Council of Ministers Press Release, supra note 9. 
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to protection from political persecution is at risk.13 Critics argue that 
the political offense exception to extradition was designed to, and in 
fact does, protect the individual's right to revolt against oppression.14 
In this view, the political offense exception does not promote terror-
ism, and its elimination would in fact serve to erode basic human rights 
of the fugitive. 15 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of extradition law in Europe 
and the development of the political offense exception. Part II dis-
cusses, generally, how various Western European jurisdictions have 
attempted to define "political offense," and apply the exception. Part 
III examines the development of interstate extradition in the United 
States. Finally, part IV of this Note compares U.S. extradition proce-
dure with that of the European Union to determine the most effective 
way for the European Union to harmonize its extradition procedures 
while still protecting the rights of fugitives. This Note concludes that 
elimination of the political offense exception to extradition is not the 
most effective way for the EU members to combat terrorism. Neverthe-
less, if EU members ratifY the new treaty, this Note suggests the imme-
diate implementation of certain procedural safeguards aimed at pro-
tecting the fugitive's human rights. 
I. THE HISTORY oF ExTRADITION LAw IN EuROPE AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT oF THE PoLITICAL OFFENSE ExcEPTION 
Neither the duty to extradite, nor the duty to prosecute a fugitive is 
a generally recognized principle of international law.16 International 
law does not address the internal security affairs of states because it is 
intended only to regulate the activities of individuals who may claim 
international legal statusP Nevertheless, as international law devel-
13 See Amnesty International Worried About EU Extradition Pact, Reuter Eur. Community Rpt., 
Sept. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. 
14 See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAw, AND THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 76 (1992); SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 180 (1968). The exception also provides for use of violence to escape oppression 
when the victims of such violence are not innocent civilians, but rather opposition military or a 
combatant police force. BLAKESLEY, supra, at 76. 
15 See BLAKESLY, supra note 14, at 270. 
16 See OPPENHEIM's INTERNATIONAL LAw § 415, at 950 (Robert jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM's]; lA. Shearer, International Legal Notes, 68 AusTL. LJ. 
451, 451 (1994). 
17 Colin Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism, 
32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 89 (1983). 
232 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
oped in the 18th century, political asylum became increasingly less 
likely to be granted in cases of extradition.18 At that time, mobility of 
offenders was increasing, and states were thus driven towards greater 
cooperation in criminal matters in order to protect their own citizens. 19 
Because extradition is not a recognized tenet of international law, 
states would extradite fugitives only on the basis of reciprocity, usually 
expressed in a bilateral or multilateral treaty.20 
As extradition treaty provisions became increasingly hostile to the 
concept of political asylum, public opinion, fueled by the rise of revo-
lutionary ideology in the mid-18th century, urged a new openness to 
political offenders.21 France was one of the first to codify the right to 
political asylum in its 1793 Constitution. 22 The Constitution guaranteed 
political asylum to those who were forced to flee their countries while 
fighting for liberty.23 
With the advent of this new political ideology of the right to revolt 
and the rights to use violence against and seek protection from one's 
country of oppression, the modern principle of the political offender 
exception to extradition gained acceptance by the mid-19th century.24 
Thus, in 1833, Belgium became the first country to pass an Extradition 
Act, as well as the first to grant the political offender protection by per 
se exempting her from extradition.25 
In 1856, Belgium was also the first to create an exception to the 
political offense exception which provided that the assassination or 
attempted assassination of a head of state, or her family members, was 
per se extraditable.26 The creation of this so-called "clause de'attentat" 
marked the beginning of the attempt to define political offenses, by 
negatively enumerating those crimes which would never be considered 
political.27 This clause became widely accepted throughout Western 
Europe, and today the depolitization approach has become the most 
18 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 8. 
19Jd. 
2° See Shearer, supra note 16, at 451. 
21 VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 9. 
22Jd. 
25Jd. 
24Jd. 
25 See id. at 163; Valerie Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties 
in An~American]urisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L LJ. 61, 63 (1979). 
26 OPPENHEIM's, supra note 16, at § 424; Epps, supra note 25, at 79. 
27 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 15. For example, the 1957 European Convention 
on Extradition provides in Article 3, that "(t]he taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head 
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common way Member States have dealt with the political offense ex-
ception to extradition.28 
Thus, in examining the history of extradition law, it becomes clear 
that the duty to extradite in international law comes essentially from 
treaty obligation, and that the right to extradite is derived from a state's 
sovereign right to deny asylum. 29 Therefore, extradition law is an ex-
ception to the general principle of asylum, and the political offense 
exception is a reservation of a state's right to refuse to extradite for 
certain crimes. 30 
of State or a member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offense for the purposes 
of this Convention." European Convention on Extradition, supra note 3. 
28 See GEOFF GILBERT, AsPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAw 140 (1991); Epps, supra note 25, at 79. 
Examples of other common exceptions to the political offense exception are: genocide; war 
crimes; apartheid; collaboration with the enemy and terrorism. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 
II, at 16. 
29 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 186; Otto Lagodny, The European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism?, 60 U. Cow. L. REv. 583,595 (1989). 
The individual's right to be protected from return to a country where she has suffered, or 
reasonably and justifiably fears, persecution, is a recognized principle of international law, known 
as the principle of non-refoulement. GUNNEL STEINBERG, NoN-EXPULSION AND NONREFOULE-
MENT, 246 (1989); VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note II, at 77; see, e.g., U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 176 (1951) [hereinafter Refugee Conven-
tion]. Article 33 provides: "1. No contracting State shall expel or return ( 'refouler) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion." !d. 
While there is arguably no internationally recognized legal duty to grant asylum, due to 
principles of sovereignty, it is nevertheless accepted that the principle of non-refoulement applies 
to all states, whether or not they have ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, or its 1967 Protocol. See Refugee Convention, supra; U.N. Refugee Protocol, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267 (1967); GuYS. GoODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 169 (1996). 
The question remains, however, as to whether the principle of non-refoulement applies to 
situations of extradition, and how to apply it. See GooDWIN-GILL, supra at 103; VAN DEN 
WIJNGAERT, supra note II, at 77; Martin E. Gold, Note, Non-Extradition for Political Offenses: The 
Communist Perspective, II HARV. INT'L LJ. 191, 192 (1970). Most legal theorists agree that 
non-refoulement simply does not apply to extradition. See GooDWIN-GILL, supra at 103; VAN DEN 
WIJNGAERT, supra note II, at 77; Gold, supra at 192; see, e.g., Refugee Convention, Article 33 
provides: 
The benefit of the [nonrefoulement] provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security 
of the country in which he is, or, who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
ld. at 137. Note that in modern practice, the Western European approach allows extradition in 
the absence of a treaty, based on reciprocal domestic extradition laws. BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, 
at 186; see Lagodny, supra at 595. 
~0 vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note II, at 45. It should be noted that the political offense 
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II. APPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION IN THEORY 
AND IN PRACTICE 
No statute or treaty has attempted to positively define the term 
"political offense."31 Western European courts have, albeit inconsis-
tently, attempted to enumerate factors to guide courts in distinguishing 
violent common crimes from political offenses.32 In 1891, a British 
court made one of the earliest attempts to apply, and to restrict the 
scope of the political offense exception. 33 The court in In re Castioni 
interpreted a political offense to be a crime: 
done in furtherance of, with the intention of assistance, as a 
sort of overt act in the course of acting in a political manner, 
a political uprising, or a dispute between two parties in the 
state, as to which is to have the government in its hands ... 
acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of 
violence of a political character with a political movement and 
uprising in which the fugitive was taking part.34 
Later, in In re Meunier, the English courts further restricted the 
definition of a political offender.35 The court ruled that a fugitive who 
is an anarchist cannot be found to be a political offender because 
anarchy "is the enemy of all [g]overnments," and thus inherently 
non-political. 36 
exception is not the only exception to extradition commonly found in bilateral and multilateral 
treaties. /d. The principle of dual criminality which provides that a fugitive will not be extradited 
unless the charge qualifies as an offense (usually a "serious" offense) in both the requesting and 
the requested states, has been an important part of extradition law. Other exceptions are the 
right to refuse to extradite a national of the requested state, and the principle of specialty which 
provides that the requesting state must guarantee that it will only prosecute the fugitive for the 
extraditable crime for which extradition was requested. Id. 
31 BLAKESLEY, sufn'a note 14, at 264; GILBERT, sufn'a note 28, at 118; see OPPENHEIM'S, sufn'a 
note 16, at§ 422. 
32 See GILBERT, sufn'a note 28, at 140. 
33 Epps, sufn'a note 25, at 64. Even before the political offense exception was conceived, Great 
Britain had become embroiled in a storm of protest due to the extradition of a number of Spanish 
rebels to Spain by the British Governor of Gibraltar in 1815. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, sufn'a note 11, 
at 11. Public opinion demanded that no nation should be allowed to refuse asylum to political 
refugees. /d. 
34 1 Q.B. 156, 159 (1891); L.C. Green, Hijacking, Extradition and Asylum, 22 CHITTY's LJ. 135, 
140 (1974). 
352 Q.B. 415,419 (1894). 
36 /d. 
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More recently, Western European courts have attempted to catego-
rize political offenses into "purely political offenses" and "relative po-
litical offenses. "37 A pure political offense is one that is exclusively 
aimed at the state or against some political interest, without injuring 
private persons, property or interests, and not accompanied by the 
commission of any common crime.38 Typically, disputes between Mem-
ber States have not arisen from refusal to extradite for pure political 
offenses.39 The reason is that, usually, pure political offenses do not 
satisfY the requirement of dual criminality, and are not included in the 
treaty's list of extraditable offenses.40 
Instead, disputes between Member States may arise when the re-
questing state seeks extradition of a fugitive for a "relative political 
offense."41 Relative political offenses may be characterized as either 
delit complexe or delit connexe.42 Delit complexe is a crime that is political 
in terms of motive because it is directed against the political order, but 
it also consists of the commission of a common crime in that a private 
right is violated.43 For instance, a terrorist bombing of a police station 
which injured a civilian could be considered a delit complexe.44 Delit 
connexe, on the other hand, is not directed specifically at the political 
order, but is a common crime that is closely connected with another 
act that is directed against the political order.45 An example of a delit 
connexe would be the theft of guns in order to arm a guerrilla group 
opposed to the state.46 Disputes between Member States tend to arise 
when extradition is refused for a relative political offender precisely 
because these involve the injury of private rights.47 
Disputes also tend to arise because Western European courts have 
been inconsistent in defining and interpreting what constitutes a po-
litical offense.48 Only a very general, three-pronged approach to deter-
37 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 118. 
38 See id.; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 106. Examples of pure political offenses are 
treason, sedition or espionage. Id. at 107. 
39 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 119; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 106. 
40 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 119; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 107. 
41 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 119; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 107. 
42GILBERT, supra note 28, at 119. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46Jd. 
47 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 119. 
48 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 186. 
236 BosTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
mine the scope of the political offense exception can be discerned.49 
First, the courts are likely to widen the scope of the political offense 
exception when dealing with a non-democratic state.50 Second, the 
exception will often be restricted when the offense is deemed "seri-
ous. "51 Finally, the courts often consider the political character of the 
crime vis a vis the requesting state.52 
The courts reason that such a three-pronged approach serves three 
distinct purposes. 53 First, the a priori denial of extradition of political 
offenders permits the requested state to remain neutral as to the 
internal political affairs of the requesting state. 54 As such, the political 
offense exception serves as a sort of "black box" for cases where the 
requested state does not want to extradite, and prefers not to reveal its 
reasons.55 A state may choose to remain neutral in the face of the 
possibility that today's political offenders could be tomorrow's lead-
ers.56 
The second purpose of the three-pronged approach is to allow the 
requested state to protect its own citizens from violent criminals. 57 The 
assumption is that political offenses are not inherently criminal be-
cause the fugitive acted, in her mind, in the interests of society, rather 
than for personal motives.58 Thus, in theory, a politically motivated 
offender does not threaten the safety of the requested state's citizens. 59 
The third purpose is to allow the requested state to adhere to the 
principle of non-refoulement, and avoid extraditing a fugitive to her 
country of persecution. 5° Technically, under the wording of most trea-
ties, if the fugitive is found to have committed a political offense, it is 
irrelevant that the requesting state is neutral in the political struggle 
in which the fugitive is involved.61 Examining the political character of 
49 See id. at 185. 
50 /d. 
51Jd. 
52 VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 186. 
53 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 270; GILBERT, supra note 28, at 113; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, 
supra note 11, at 185. 
54 GILBERT, supra note 28, at 113. 
55 BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 270. 
56 vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 3. 
57 Id. 
58 ld. 
59 See id. 
60 See Christine van den Wijngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to 
Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 757, 761-62 (1990). 
61 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 152. 
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the fugitive's crime vis a vis the requesting state requires the requested 
state to determine if the crime was directed against the political order 
of the requesting state. 52 Presumably, if the requesting country is not 
the country whose political order the fugitive is attacking, the fugitive's 
basic rights of due process, fair trial, and freedom from persecution 
are unlikely to be jeopardized. 63 
Unfortunately, the approach outlined above is only a tendency, and 
no jurisdiction has been uniform in its application. 54 For instance, the 
Belgium Court of Appeals in In re Abarca held that an anti-Franco 
fugitive who had attempted to place a bomb on a Spain-bound plane 
at the Geneva airport, which could have caused the deaths of 60 
innocent passengers and crew members, had not committed a political 
offense.65 The crime was found to be non-political because the poten-
tial seriousness of the crime against innocent victims outweighed the 
political motive behind it.66 Thus, the court issued an advisory opinion 
that Abarca was extraditable to Switzerland. 57 
The Counseil d'Etat, however, ignored the advisory opinion and 
refused extradition on grounds that the crime was political, both be-
cause of motive and because additional attacks were being arranged in 
London, Paris and Geneva, simultaneously, by the same anti-Franco 
terrorist group.68 This protection of a dangerous terrorist could easily 
have been avoided by applying the third prong of the test to find that, 
although political, the character of the act was not political vis a vis 
Switzerland. 59 Thus, Abarca could justifY the elimination of the political 
offense exception, or it could stand simply for the need for members 
of the European Union to adopt a consistent approach in interpreting 
what constitutes a political offense.70 
In addition to the general tendency of the European courts to 
attempt to determine the scope of the political offense exception, 
Switzerland and England have developed two very distinct approaches 
for identifYing political crimes.71 The Swiss predominance/proportion-
62 VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 176. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66Jd. 
67vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 176. 
68Jd. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 266; GILBERT, supra note 28, at 128. 
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ality approach and the Anglo political incidence approach illustrate 
the complications involved in trying to identify political offenses.72 
Article 10 of the 1892 Swiss Extradition Act allows extradition even in 
cases where the criminal act had a political motive or end, provided 
that the act for which the alleged offender has been requested consti-
tutes primarily a common offense. 73 Thus, the Act excepts from extra-
dition only those political crimes with a predominantly political char-
acter.74 The Swiss Federal Tribunal has interpreted predominantly 
political crimes to be those where the offense bears direct relation to 
the end sought.75 The criminal act must also be the sole means of safe-
guarding critical interests of the political organization and of realizing 
its goal. 76 If the crime is particularly egregious, however, the political 
motive will not be allowed to protect the fugitive from extradition. 77 
Perhaps the clearest example of the practical application of the Swiss 
proportionality test is the Federal Tribunal's 1961 opinion in Re Kavic, 
Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic. 78 That case dealt with a Yugoslavian extradi-
tion request for three crew members of a Yugoslav plane who hijacked 
and diverted the plane to Switzerland in an attempt to flee Yugoslavia. 79 
The court conducted a balancing test which considered both the injury 
to private persons and property, as well as the interests of the accused.80 
The court held that: 
Recent practice has been too restrictive in making the relative 
political character of an offense dependent on its commission 
in the framework of a fight for power. Such a character must 
also be attributed to offenses which were committed in order 
to escape the constraint of a state which makes all opposition, 
and, therefore, the fight for power impossible. In this connec-
tion there can also be applied the principle that the relation 
between the purpose and the means adopted for its achieve-
ment must be such that the ideals connected with the purpose 
are sufficiently strong to excuse, if not justify, the injury to 
72 See id. 
73 VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 126. 
74 /d. 
75 Green, supra note 34, at 138. 
76 Ktir v. Ministere Public Federal, 341.L.R. 143, 144 (1961); BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 266; 
see GILBERT, supra note 28, at 128. 
77 Re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. 371, 374 (1952); Green, supra note 34, at 138. 
78 See Re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. at 374; Green, supra note 34, at 138. 
79 Green, supra note 34, at 138. 
80 See id. 
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private property, and to make the offender appear worthy of 
asylum. Freedom from constraint of a totalitarian State must 
be regarded as an ideal in this sense. In the present case the 
required relationship undoubtedly exists; for, on the one 
hand, the offenses against the other members of the crew 
were not very serious, and, on the other hand, political free-
dom and even existence of the accused was at stake, and 
could only be achieved through the commission of these 
offenses. 81 
239 
In contrast, the Federal Tribunal later applied the same test in Ktir 
v. MinisterePublic Federa~ but granted a French extradition request for 
a member of the Algerian F.L.N. who had been charged with the 
murder of another F.L.N. member.82 The court found that the fugitive 
was extraditable because, although the motive behind the criminal act 
was found to be political, the interests at stake were not sufficiently 
important to excuse the injury to private rights.83 
Many legal theorists have hailed the Swiss proportionality approach 
as the best way to apply the political offense exception.84 On the other 
hand, critics point out that the test is too subjective as it necessarily 
imposes the common and popular ideals and values of one state on 
the other.85 As Dr. Kaye Holloway, a French expert in international 
terrorism remarked: 
States which are direct or indirect accomplices may sacrifice 
an agent incompetent enough to be caught, or who is a 
liability, but no State will extradite a high-ranking member of 
a government with which it has diplomatic relations, much 
less a ruler in a bloody, terrorist regime who has fled.86 
Another approach to determining the political character of crimes 
was established in 1891 by Great Britain.87 As discussed above, In re 
Castioni defined political offenses as ones which are "incidental to and 
form a part of political disturbances. "88 This is a more objective ap-
8! Re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. at 374. 
82 Ktir v. Ministere Public Federa~ 34 I.L.R. at 144; BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 267. 
83 Ktir v. Ministere Public Federa~ 34 I.L.R. at 144; BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 267. 
84 See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 28, at 131. 
85vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 132. 
86 INTERNATIONAL 'ThRRORISM: POLITICAL AND LEGAL DoCUMENTS 548 (Yonah Alexander, ed. 
1992). 
87BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 267. 
88 /d. 
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proach than the Swiss predominance/proportionality test because an 
offender's subjective motive can never be enough to make a common 
crime a political one. On the contrary, it is the crime, not the criminal, 
which is determinative of political character.89 The problem, however, 
with this approach is that too little attention is paid to the egregious 
or international nature of the crime.9° C.L. Blakesely, in fact, asserts 
that the political incidence test "has become a quagmire of nonsense 
that has worked to exempt from extradition some who should not have 
been exempted, and has not allowed exception to others who perhaps 
should be covered by it. "!II 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERSTATE EXTRADITION PROCEDURES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Extradition between states in the United States (called "rendition") 
developed for reasons quite similar to those in Western Europe: the 
inability, due to lack of jurisdiction, of one state to prosecute or punish 
an individual who has violated the laws of another state.92 As is cur-
rently true with the EU Member States, in the 1600s, the various 
colonies would enter into rendition agreements to ensure reciprocity.93 
As the colonies began to form an actual "union," however, there was 
recognition of the need for rendition procedure to be harmonized.94 
In explaining the need for a Constitutional provision mandating 
rendition of fugitives, James Madison espoused three reasons.95 First, 
the citizens of each state are naturalized within all states and are thus 
entitled to the same privileges as natives of a given state.96 Therefore, 
it is only just that each individual also be subjected to the same penal-
ties.97 Second, the similarity of laws throughout the states obviates any 
possible objections against removal of a fugitive.98 Finally, without ren-
dition a fugitive would be rewarded for flight with criminal immunity 
89 GILBERT, supra note 28, at 122. 
90 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 117. 
9! BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 80. 
92 Note, Interstate Renditiun and the Fourth Amendment, 24 RuTGERS L. REv. 551, 551 (1970). 
93 See jacob A. Manheimer, Interstate Renditiun Violatiuns & Section 1983: Locating the Federal 
Rights of Fugitives, 50 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1268, 1271 (1982). 
94 I.T. Hoague, Extradition Between States: Executive Discretion, 13 AM. L. REv. 181, 188 (1879). 
95 /d. at 187. 
96Jd. 
97 /d. 
98 Id. 
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because the asylum state does not have jurisdiction to try and punish 
her.99 Thus, Article IV, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides: 
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other 
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another 
State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State 
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the 
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.100 
In 1793, in response to states' confusion over how to implement the 
provision, Congress promulgated the Federal Rendition Act in an 
attempt to harmonize procedures between the states. 101 In the early 
stages of struggling with rendition procedure, there were significant 
conflicts between the states when the requested state refused rendi-
tion.102 Refusal was not questioned when it was based on the formalistic 
insufficiency of the requesting state's demand. 103 Refusal did, however, 
cause great rifts in interstate relations when it was based on potential 
due process violations in the requesting state, or on the basis that the 
crime for which the fugitive was requested was not a crime in the 
asylum state.104 
Slaveholding states, seeking the return of an escaped slave, were the 
most frequently denied requests.105 Some slaveholding states resorted 
to making it a felony for a slave to flee, or premising the rendition 
request on other charges such as theft (of clothing, or the horse used 
for the flight) .106 These requests were generally refused by interpreting 
"other crime," in Article IV of the Constitution, to mean crimes which 
were recognized as crimes by the common consent of civilized nations, 
or by the law of the requested state. 107 
Even after the slavery issue vanished from the scene, states have still 
occasionally refused to rendite when the requested state finds a likeli-
99Hoague, supra note 94, at 187. 
IOOU.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2. 
101 Hoague, supra note 94, at 184; Interstate Rendition and the Fm.trth Amendment, supra note 
92, at 555. 
102 See Hoague, supra note 94, at 192. 
103 See id. The demand was "sufficient" when the requesting state demonstrated the existence 
of a charge, the ''fugitivity" of the individual sought, and the proper filing of paperwork. See id. 
104Note, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 YALE LJ. 97, 110 
(1956). 
105 See Hoague, supra note 94, at 209. 
106 See id. at 209-10. 
107 See id. 
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hood of due process violations in the requesting state. 108 For instance, 
in 1937, Massachusetts refused to rendite to Georgia a black prisoner 
who had escaped from a chain gang, citing Georgia's record for abuse 
of prisoners. 109 The Supreme Court has held that, although the re-
quested state does not have the right to exercise discretion once the 
requirements of the Act are met, this duty is a "moral" one which rests 
on notions of comity between states. 110 Thus, in the event the requested 
state fails to exercise its duty as mandated, no federal mandamus will 
issue. 111 
In addition to occasional refusals of rendition requests when due 
process guarantees are implicated, the fugitive also has the opportunity 
to be heard on the matter of having the request refused. 112 First, 
although the fugitive has no statutory or Constitutional right to a 
hearing before the governor of the asylum state, in the vast majority 
of cases, the governor does grant the fugitive the opportunity to be 
heard on why rendition should be refused. 113 Second, a fugitive is 
constitutionally guaranteed a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality 
of detention prior to rendition.114 Generally, if the court in habeas 
proceedings finds the executive's decision to rendite justified, the 
fugitive will not be released.115 
IV. DoEs ELIMINATION oF THE PoLITICAL OFFENSE ExcEPTION TO 
ExTRADITION ALLow FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FuGITIVE's 
HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Impunity, and Asylum are m(Yre ar less the same. . . . Asylum is a better 
invitation to crimes than punishment a deterrent. 
-Cesare Beccaria, "Dei Delitti e Delle Pene"116 
As has become clear from over a century of experience in Western 
Europe and the United States, the necessary practice of interstate 
extradition and rendition calls into play a number of sensitive issues.117 
108 See Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, supra note 104, at 110. 
109 Id. at 111 n.74. 
110 Interstate Rendition and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 92, at 554; Kentucky v. Dennison, 
65 u.s. 66, 107 (1861). 
111Jd. 
112 See Interstate Rendition and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 92, at 557. 
113 Id. 
114 /d. at 558. 
115Jd. 
116vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 8. 
117 See id. at 77; Hoague, supra note 94, at 192; Shearer, supra note 16, at 451. 
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First is the issue of how to protect the fugitive's basic human rights 
when it is suspected that the requesting state may violate those rights. 118 
Second is the problem of how to refuse extradition, when refusal is 
deemed necessary, without initiating a breakdown of cooperative rela-
tions between the states involved.ll9 Third, is the issue of how to ensure 
that no criminal will be rewarded with immunity from criminal prose-
cution simply for fleeing the site of the crime.120 Extradition scholar, 
Christine van den Wijngaert, has correctly observed that the role of 
the political offense exception in Western Europe has been a "current 
and constant encouragement to terrorism. "121 The reason is that states 
may refuse to extradite terrorists, who, in turn, exploit their impunity 
and plan new terrorist attacks.122 Additionally, the non-extradition of 
alleged ETA terrorists from France and Belgium to Spain, and of IRA 
terrorists from Ireland to the United Kingdom, has caused serious 
political relations problems between those countries.123 Thus, the Euro-
pean Union correctly recognized the need to harmonize and facilitate 
extradition procedures in an attempt to minimize both terrorist attacks 
and intra-union disputes.124 
The political offense exception was created to protect the fugitive's 
human rights, and simultaneously to protect the requested state's in-
terest in remaining neutral as to the internal affairs of the requesting 
state. 125 The political offense exception has been criticized on grounds 
that the notion of human rights is actually a hindrance to combating 
international crime.126 The corollary to this argument is that the hu-
man rights of the political offender are a domestic matter and the 
responsibility of the requesting state.127 It is often assumed that the 
right not to extradite can be preserved by the requested state's sover-
eign right to grant asylum. 128 
The European Union, in agreeing to the new extradition conven-
tion, has accepted the idea that the political offense exception may be 
118 See van den Wijngaert, supra note 60, at 762. 
119 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 283; GILBERT, supra note 28, at 113; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, 
supra note 11, at 3. 
120 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 23; Hoague, supra note 94, at 188. 
121 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 23. 
l22 See id. 
123 See Warbrick, supra note 17, at 109--10. 
124 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 23; War brick, supra note 17, at 109-10. 
125BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 282. 
126 /d. 
127 /d.; van den Wijngaert, supra note 60, at 760. 
128 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 25, at 88. 
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safely eliminated because sufficient human rights mechanisms are al-
ready in place to protect a fugitive who may be at risk. 129 On the 
contrary, if the Member States ratify the new treaty, which they are 
expected to do over the next few months, human rights within the 
Union will be put at serious risk.130 In eliminating the political offense 
exception, the European Union ignores the fact that human rights 
treaties will not necessarily trump the extradition treaty when the 
international obligation to refuse extradition on grounds of potential 
human rights violations conflicts with the treaty obligation to extra-
dite.131 Further, despite the internationally recognized principle of non-
refoulement which serves as the basis for claims of humanitarian and 
political asylum, non-refoulement does not apply to extradition.132 
States may thus extradite political refugees, accused of crimes in the 
requesting state, to their countries of persecution.133 
The only current international legal limit on this practice is the 
political offense exception.134 Elimination of the political offense ex-
ception from the new extradition convention means that the human 
rights of the political refugee will depend entirely upon the domestic 
law of the requesting state. 135 This may be small comfort for the indi-
vidual who risks persecution if returned to the state against which the 
crime was perpetrated.136 For example, Amnesty International has ex-
pressed concern over the inadequacy of Spain's non-refoulement pro-
cedures, and thus over whether it is appropriate for Spain to be desig-
nated as a "safe third country."137 Also, at present, Belgium's courts are 
not even permitted to enforce the principle of non-refoulement in 
extradition proceedings.138 
129 See Amn~ty International Worried Abuut EU Extradition Pact, supra note 13. 
130 See id. 
131 See van den Wijngaert, supra note 60, at 761-62. 
U2vAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 77. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 14, at 266. 
137 Jacqueline Bhabha, European Harmonization of Asylum Policy: A Flawed Process, 35 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 101, 110 (1994). A "safe third country" is a country in which the asylum seeker either 
has found protection or reasonably could have done so. See Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shac-
knove, The Safe Cuuntry Notion in European Asylum Law, 9 HARV. HuM. RTs.J. 185, 188 (1996). 
Thus, the country to which the individual applies for asylum may return that applicant to any 
"safe third country" through which she has passed. See id. 
UBvAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 11, at 183. The court can, however, apply this principle in 
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The likelihood of inadequate application of human rights principles 
to requests for extradition as a result of the elimination of the political 
offense exception is only one problem with the new convention.139 
Additionally, elimination of the exception within a regional framework 
such as the European Union suggests that the Member States are 
willing to assume that no other Member State will ever violate the 
interests and human rights of its residents.140 In reality, there is no 
reason why a political offender, who has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution in the requesting State, should be extradited merely because 
the requested state is politically sympathetic. 141 
The United States struggled with nearly identical issues while har-
monizing its rendition procedures in the 1700s.142 Much like the ap-
proach now taken by the European Union, the United States similarly 
did not consider fugitives' rights when designing rendition law.143 The 
purpose of rendition law was simply to enhance cooperation and im-
prove relations between the states.144 Nevertheless, the United States 
already had the constitutional safeguard of a writ of habeas corpus 
which allowed the fugitive to challenge the legality of her detention 
and, in the process, to challenge the rendition itself.145 Such an oppor-
tunity is not yet a possibility in the European Union because the 
Member States have yet to cede any sovereignty in domestic security 
matters to a single European tribunal.146 
Despite the ultimate desire of the European Union to function as 
both an economically and politically unified entity, Member States 
currently retain their sovereign powers in fields such as security and 
defense.147 Thus, it seems inappropriate to ignore important questions 
the "exequatur" proceedings and refuse to endorse the requesting state's warrant. See id. There 
is, however, no method of review if the warrant is endorsed. See id. 
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141 GILBERT, supra note 28, at 139; Green, supra note 34, at 140. 
142 See Hoague, supra note 94, at 555; Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of 
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such as: what is a stable democracy?; what result if there is a change in 
the political system?; and how does the requesting state define violent 
crimes?148 It is important to recognize the principle that the European 
Union should not exist for the purpose of preserving established gov-
ernments.149 Furthermore, a purely regionalized attempt to remove any 
safe havens for terrorists may well alienate those states excluded from 
joining the European Union, thereby encouraging new safe harbors 
for international terrorists.150 
CONCLUSION 
The elimination of the political offense exception is a dangerous 
path for the European Union to head down. The elimination serves 
neither the interests of the individual in protecting her human rights, 
nor the interests of the European Union in being an effective deterrent 
to international terrorism. Although the new extradition convention 
is likely to be ratified by all fifteen Member States sometime in 1998, 
a more effective approach could be developed by specifying the meth-
od by which courts should apply the political offense exception, retain-
ing current exceptions to the political offense exception, and adding 
a specifically defined exception for terrorism. Ideally, the elimination 
of the political offense exception would be considered only after the 
creation of an individual right to appeal in extradition proceedings, 
similar to the writ of habeas corpus in the United States. 
148 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 140. 
149 See GooDWIN-GILL, supra note 29, at 66. 
150 See GILBERT, supra note 28, at 139. 
Renuka E. Rao 
